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We investigate how a domestic subsidy is treated in an international agreement, when a
government, having incentive to use its subsidy as a means of import protection, can disguise
its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention with which to address a market
imperfection in the import-competing sector. We show that any optimal agreement permits
the use of a positive domestic subsidy, but it restricts the home government’s freedom to
select domestic subsidy in order to increase the market-access level for foreign exporters.
Our ﬁnding implies that proper restrictions on domestic subsidies are somewhere between
GATT and WTO rules.
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Domestic subsidies have aroused disputes in the international trading system. International
disputes over domestic subsidies are not surprising in that a proper treatment of domestic
subsidies in an international agreement is not obvious. Two contrasting perspectives are
often stated on theoretical and actual trade-policy levels. A domestic subsidy, for instance,
is a “legitimate” instrument with which to address a market imperfection that leads to under-
production. At the same time, however, it may be used as a means of import protection that
oﬀsets the beneﬁts of tariﬀ liberalization. Indeed, this latter perspective has long provided
a justiﬁcation for the continuing attempts by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to
treat domestic subsidies in a strict manner: WTO has introduced additional regulations on
subsidies that were not present in the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT).
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM agreement) represents
as i g n i ﬁcant strengthening of disciplines on subsidies.1
A recent study by Bagwell and Staiger (2006) asserts, however, that a proper treatment
of domestic subsidies is the non-violation nulliﬁcation-or-impairment complaints of GATT
rules. They emphasize that domestic subsidies were treated in a fairly tolerant manner under
GATT rules: subsequent to a tariﬀ commitment, a government was granted the freedom
to alter its domestic subsidies provided that such adjustments do not erode the market-
access level implied by the tariﬀ commitment. As Bagwell (2008) highlights, a key diﬀerence
between GATT and WTO rules is that the SCM agreement now restricts the freedom and
allows that a domestic subsidy may be actionable independently of whether it nulliﬁes or
impairs the market-access level associated with a prior tariﬀ commitment.2 From a somewhat
diﬀerent angle, Sykes (2005, 2009) argues that the problem with the WTO’s restrictions on
domestic subsidies arises mainly from the conceptual and practical diﬃculties of determining
which domestic subsidies are used as undesirable protective measure; without the diﬃculties,
restrictions on domestic subsidies might be negotiated to target only the protective use of
subsidies.3 Sykes maintains that it is arguably impossible to develop general principles that
1For more discussion, see Sykes (2005, 2009), Bagwell (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2006).
2As Bagwell (2008) reports, a domestic subsidy may now be actionable even if the relevant product is not subject to
any tariﬀ commitment or the subsidy already existed at the time of any tariﬀ commitment.
3The non-violation complaints of GATT rules had also proved diﬃcult to carry out in practice. From 1947 through
1995 only 14 out of the more than 250 Article XXIII proceedings had centered on such complaints (Petersmann, 1997).
1distinguish permissible subsidies from impermissible subsidies.
In this paper, motivated by these thorny and yet important issues featured on theoret-
ical and actual trade-policy levels, we investigate how a domestic subsidy is treated in an
international agreement. The model contains two key ingredients. First, a domestic sub-
sidy is a legitimate instrument with which to address a market imperfection that leads to
under-production in the import-competing sector: the ﬁrst-best government intervention is
to use a domestic subsidy and internalize the aﬀected margin directly, as prescribed by the
targeting principle (Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963 and Johnson, 1965). Second, the gov-
ernment, having incentive to use its subsidy as a means of import protection, can disguise
its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention: its trading partner or a third party
cannot determine whether its subsidy is used as protective measure to circumvent the tariﬀ
commitment. We consider a 2-country 2-good model in which trade occurs in two countries,
home and foreign countries, where markets are perfectly competitive. To formalize the two
features, our model is augmented in two respects. First, a domestic production of import
good by the home country generates a positive externality within the border. Second, the
home government has private information about externality levels and thus about subsidy
levels that are necessary to internalize the production externality. In particular, we develop
an incomplete-information model with a continuum of possible externality types. To de-
liver our main points simply, the model focuses on the home government’s intervention only
in its import-competing sector. Instead, it allows for two policy instruments:ad o m e s t i c
production subsidy and an import tariﬀ.
The starting point of our analysis is to identify a central incentive problem posed in the
model: subsequent to a tariﬀ-reduction commitment, the home government has incentive to
raise its subsidy for the protective purpose. When the home government neglects foreign
exporters and raises its subsidy, it can lower the world price of the foreign export good and
thus bring a terms-of-trade gain (loss) to the home (foreign) country.4 This problem causes
This fact might reﬂect the diﬃculties of determining the trade eﬀects of domestic policy changes.
4The terms-of-trade approach to international agreements is robust in various theoretical settings. Recent empirical
evidence is also consistent with the terms-of-trade theory of agreements (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, forthcoming
and Broda, Limao and Weinstein, 2008). On actual policy levels, by contrast, terms of trade are not featured
as much as the market-access level implied by trade policy. As Bagwell (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999,
2002) show, however, the loss in market access that foreign exporters experience when the home government raises
its tariﬀ (or subsidy) is simply the “quantity eﬀect” that accompanies the “price eﬀect” of a deterioration in the foreign
2the concern that the subsidy may oﬀset the beneﬁts of the negotiated tariﬀ commitment.
Our model makes this concern clearly evident, by assuming that the home government with
private information can disguise its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention and
circumvent the tariﬀ commitment.5
In this paper, when governments reach an international agreement, they specify the policy
set from which they can select their policy pairs. We assume that an international agreement
is enforceable if and only if the associated policy set is incentive compatible: if the policy set
is (not) incentive compatible, the agreement is (not) enforceable. A policy set is incentive
compatible if it is speciﬁed such that the home government with one externality type must
not gain from selecting the policy mix that is prescribed for this government when it has
ad i ﬀerent externality type. This incentive constraint is analogous to the standard truth-
telling constraint encountered in mechanism-design problems. We say that an agreement is
optimal when the associated policy set is incentive compatible and generates at least as high
expected global welfare as any incentive compatible policy set. We consider the following
stage game: (i) two governments write an agreement that speciﬁes the policy set, (ii) the
home government privately observes its own externality types and (iii) the home government
selects its policy mix from the policy set speciﬁed by the agreement.
We begin with a hypothetical agreement in which the home government is granted the
ﬂexibility (freedom) to select any policy mix from the policy set that preserves the world
price of the foreign export good at a constant level. Since the home government can lower
the world price by raising tariﬀ or subsidy, this policy set can be represented by a decreasing
function on which tariﬀ falls as subsidy rises. Along this iso-world-price function where the
foreign country’s terms of trade is constant, the home government, having no incentive to
manipulate terms of trade, selects the Pigouvian subsidy that internalizes the production
externality at the margin. The policy set acts as a sorting (separating) scheme along which
the home government truthfully reveals its externality type.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that the separating agreement is not optimal: it can be improved on
country’s terms-of-trade.
5A related concern is raised by the European Communities (WTO, 2002, pp. 2-3): “Signiﬁcant amounts of
ﬁnancial support are increasingly granted by governments for ostensibly general activities which in fact directly
beneﬁt the production of certain products. These disguised subsidies can have equally severe trade-distorting eﬀects
and they are potentially much more harmful than more direct subsidies since they confer beneﬁts in a largely
non-transparent manner.”
3by an alternative agreement that entails pooling at the top (i.e., the interval of externality
types adjoining the highest type). The agreement has strength and weakness: it addresses
the market imperfection with a ﬁrst-best instrument and yet it entails the use of high import
tariﬀs especially for low-externality types. Governments may look for some way to keep the
subsidy-eﬃciency advantage while reducing tariﬀs by developing another policy set that
has a ﬂatter slope than before. This new set, however, induces lower-externality types to
raise their subsidies and mimic higher-externality types. Hence, the (global) welfare gain
associated with the ﬁrst-best intervention can be enjoyed only if the welfare loss associated
with the “informational cost” in the form of high import tariﬀsi sa l s oe x p e r i e n c e d . T h i s
ﬁnding indicates that no optimal agreement adheres strictly to the targeting principle in its
subsidy choice. Intuitively, if an agreement uses a ﬁrst-best instrument to remedy the market
failure that leads to under-production in the import-competing sector, then it entails the use
of high import tariﬀs that additionally stimulates domestic production and thus results in
excessive import protection. The alternative agreement, sacriﬁcing the ﬁrst-best intervention
at the top, can lower import tariﬀs and raise the world price and import volume.
We next explore a pooling agreement in which policy choices are fully rigid (state-
independent). Within the class of pooling agreements, the optimal agreement restricts sub-
sidy choice to the expected value of externality types and achieves zero tariﬀ. We show that
this agreement is not optimal: it can be improved on by an alternative agreement that en-
tails sorting at the bottom (i.e., the interval of externality types adjoining the lowest type).
This alternative agreement acts to extend the original policy set for types at the bottom
while preserving the original world price at the optimal pooling agreement. The associated
home-welfare improvement thus does not impose the negative terms-of-trade externality on
the foreign welfare.
We augment this ﬁnding and investigate the possibility that an agreement may tailor
the degree to which the use of subsidy is regulated, together with a commitment to zero
tariﬀ. This possibility occurs when governments adjust the degree of restrictions on subsidy
choice in order to maximize the beneﬁts of their tariﬀ liberalization. Our second ﬁnding
is that, regardless of the degree to which the use of subsidy is regulated, an agreement
in which tariﬀsa r eb o u n dt oz e r oi sn o to p t i m a l :i tc a nb ei m p r o v e do nb ya na l t e r n a t i v e
agreement that entails sorting at the bottom. Intuitively, when contemplating an agreement,
4governments face a tension between the objective of promoting domestic eﬃciency and the
objective of reducing import tariﬀs. In the three suboptimal agreements stated above, one
objective is overly emphasized and is achieved at the expense of the other objective. The ﬁrst
agreement adjusts import tariﬀs to utilize the ﬁrst-best intervention with which to internalize
t h ee x t e r n a l i t ym a r g i n ;i tc a nb ei m p r o v e do nb ya na g r e e m e n tt h a te n t a i l sp o o l i n ga tt h e
top. The second and third agreements tailor the degree of restrictions on subsidy choice to
maximize the beneﬁts of zero-tariﬀ commitment; they can be improved on by an agreement
that entails sorting at the bottom.
We next investigate how an optimal agreement resolves the tension between the two
objectives. We proceed to establish the monotonicity result: in any optimal agreement, the
world price is nonincreasing in externality levels. In an optimal agreement, the world price
cannot be higher for an externality type than for the lowest type. Intuitively, if the world
price is higher for an externality type than for the lowest type, then an alternative agreement
can be developed to contain a sorting scheme at the bottom up to the policy mix for that
type along an iso-world-price function. Inclusion of such a sorting scheme improves the home
welfare without causing a deterioration in the foreign country’s terms of trade. With this
monotonicity in place, our third ﬁnding conﬁrms that any optimal agreement entails sorting
at the bottom.6 If an optimal agreement entails pooling at the bottom, then it involves
the highest world price at the bottom because of the monotonicity. A contradiction is then
caused by an alternative agreement that entails sorting and preserves the original world price
at the bottom; this alternative agreement extends the policy set and thus improves the home
welfare without imposing a negative terms-of-trade externality on the foreign welfare. Our
fourth ﬁnding subsequently conﬁrms that any optimal agreement entails pooling at the top;
pooling at the top is necessary to lower import tariﬀs and raise the world price and import
volume.
We next establish our ﬁfth ﬁnding: no optimal agreement includes a sorting scheme (as
its policy subset) in which the world price is constant. If an agreement includes such a
sorting scheme, then a new sorting scheme can be developed by shifting the original sorting
scheme towards lower import tariﬀs. The new sorting scheme instead includes a jump from
6The sorting at the bottom here is diﬀerent from the sorting at the bottom stated above where the world price
is constant. As we show below, in any optimal agreement, the world price is strictly increasing in externality
levels over the sorting scheme at the bottom.
5its endpoint to the endpoint of the original sorting scheme such that it entails pooling at the
original endpoint. Intuitively, if a small jump is made to shift the original sorting scheme
slightly, then the marginal (global) welfare gain associated with the tariﬀ reduction is strictly
positive, but the marginal welfare loss associated with the new pooling is close to zero, since
this welfare loss is measured on the original iso-world-price function where the foreign welfare
is held constant.7 Using linear demand and supply functions and uniform distribution of
externality types, we numerically conﬁrm that an agreement creates the net global welfare
gain when it shifts any sorting scheme towards lower import tariﬀs and includes a new
jump. We then ask an important question: for any externality type, is the home government
granted the freedom to select any policy mix from the policy set that preserves the world
price at a constant level? Our ﬁnding asserts that the home government is not granted
the freedom in any optimal agreement. An optimal agreement resolves the tension between
the two objectives only when it restricts the home government’s subsidy choice and thus its
use of ﬁrst-best intervention, in order to respect terms of trade for the foreign country and
increase the market-access level for foreign exporters.8
Despite the mounting interest and evident importance, a treatment of domestic subsidies
in an international agreement has not received much attention from analytical literature.
Bagwell and Staiger (2001, 2006) oﬀer formal analyses of this issue and show that the market-
access focus of GATT rules is well qualiﬁed to be a proper treatment of domestic subsidies:
if market access is secured by the non-violation complaint at the negotiated (eﬃcient) level,
then negotiations with tariﬀs alone can achieve a policy mix that is eﬃcient from a global
perspective. The policy prescription implied by their ﬁnding is that governments need to
be granted the freedom to select any policy mix from the policy set that preserves market
access at the eﬃcient level. In particular, the non-violation complaint plays an important
7Along the original sorting scheme, the original policy choices maximize the home welfare while preserving the
foreign welfare at a constant level; the ﬁrst-order diﬀerentiation of the home welfare at the original policy choices
is zero. If the jump becomes smaller, then the new pooling point approaches the original policy choices made
along the original scheme; the ﬁrst-order diﬀerentiation of the home welfare at the new pooling point approaches zero.
The marginal home-welfare loss associated with the new pooling then becomes close to zero.
8As Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002) illuminates, whether an increase in tariﬀ or subsidy by the home government is
said to cause a terms-of-trade loss for the foreign country or al o s so fm a k e t - a c c e s sl e v e lf o rf o r e i g ne x p o r t e r si sam a t t e r
of semantics. Following their logic, we here deﬁne a market-access level that the home government aﬀords to the foreign
country by the import volume implied by policy mixes along an iso-world price function.
6role in achieving an eﬃcient policy mix in Bagwell and Staiger (2001) when governments,
subsequent to their tariﬀ negotiation, are allowed to adjust tariﬀs to preserve market access
at the negotiated level, and in Bagwell and Staiger (2006) when governments, with tariﬀs
bound by their negotiation, have suﬃcient policy redundancy to keep market access at the
negotiated level.9
Our model contains the standard features found in Bagwell and Staiger (2001, 2006): a
government, under a market-access commitment, has no incentive to distort subsidy choice
away from the eﬃcient level, and an essential factor that leads to an ineﬃcient policy mix is an
insuﬃcient consideration for the foreign country’s terms of trade. In their model, the foreign
country’s terms of trade are duly respected when an agreement leads the home government
to a ﬁrst-best intervention with which to address the market imperfection. In our model,
by contrast, the foreign country’s terms of trade are duly respected when an agreement
restricts the home government’s subsidy choice and its use of ﬁrst-best intervention. Our
ﬁndings convey two distinct policy implications. First, restrictions on subsidy choice are
necessary, and moreover, proper restrictions are stricter than what is implied by the market-
access focus of GATT rules. We show that, in any optimal agreement, two diﬀerent policy
mixes deliver two diﬀerent terms of trade for the foreign country: an optimal policy set can
be achieved by a policy-mix agreement,n o tb yac o m m i t m e n tt oas p e c i ﬁc market-access
level. Second, despite such necessary restrictions on subsidy choice, proper restrictions are
far milder than the de facto prohibition of domestic production subsidies seen under WTO
rules.10 We show that the home government is surely granted the use of a positive subsidy in
any optimal agreement: probability of using zero subsidy is zero under sorting at the bottom
and continuous distribution of externality types.
We may also compare the pooling points present at the top and potentially in other places
with the rigid (state-independent) treatment of domestic subsidies shown in Horn, Maggi and
Staiger (2010). Horn, Maggi and Staiger show that trade agreements may exhibit a rigid use
9Suﬃcient policy redundancy is present in their model when governments have an import tariﬀ, a domestic produc-
tion subsidy and a domestic consumption tax.
10Bagwell and Staiger (2006) argue that a key WTO innovation is that virtually any positive domestic subsidy can be
challenged and potentially removed. In a limited-instrument setting where policy redundancy is absent, they show
that the SCM agreement may have a “chilling” eﬀect on tariﬀ negotiations: if the legal restrictions on domestic
subsidies permit trading partners to secure the removal of subsidies, then governments may hesitate to negotiate tariﬀ
liberalization, since tariﬀs then may be the best remaining means of assisting the import-competing sector.
7of subsidy when the import volume is large. Adopting the approach that the WTO/GATT
regulation is regarded as an incomplete contract, they oﬀer a rationale for the existence of
rigidity. In their model, the use of subsidy is made partially or fully rigid in order to save
contracting costs when the import volume is large. In our model, it is made partially rigid
in order to raise the market-access level for foreign exporters and so increase the import
volume.
At a methodological level, this paper contributes to the theory of trade agreements among
governments with private information. Amador and Bagwell (2010), Bagwell (2009), Bag-
well and Staiger (2005), Beshkar (2010), Feenstra and Lewis (1991), Martin and Vergote
(2008) and Park (forthcoming) develop theoretical models of this kind. Importantly, all
these models focus on agreements on tariﬀs, whereas this paper explores agreements on two
policy instruments. Lee (2007) develops a private-information model with two policy instru-
ments, assuming two externality types and linear demand and supply functions. Our model,
however, allows for any continuous distribution function of externality types and for general
demand and supply functions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic trade model and states
the standard features that are similarly found in the literature. In Section 3, we consider
various hypothetical agreements that are not optimal. In Section 4, we present important
features found in any optimal agreement. Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix, we oﬀer
additional expositions not contained in the text and provide proofs.
2T h e M o d e l
The model contains two key ingredients. First, a domestic subsidy is a legitimate instrument
with which to address a market imperfection that leads to under-production in the import-
competing sector: the ﬁrst-best government intervention is to use a domestic subsidy and
internalize the aﬀected margin directly, as prescribed by the targeting principle. Second, a
government, having incentive to use its subsidy as a means of import protection, can disguise
its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention with which to address a market
imperfection that leads to under-production: its trading partner or a third party cannot
determine whether its subsidy is used as protective measure to circumvent the negotiated
tariﬀ commitments.
82.1 The Basic Trade Model
We consider a 2-country 2-good model in which trade occurs in two countries, home and
foreign countries, where markets are perfectly competitive. The home country exports one
good to the foreign country in exchange for imports of the other good. We proceed with
t h eg o o di nt h ei m p o r t( e x p o r t )s e c t o ro ft h eh o m e( f o r e i g n )c o u n t r y . F o rt h eg o o d ,t h e
home country has a downward-sloping demand function D(pd) f o rt h el o c a lc o n s u m e rp r i c e
pd and an upward-sloping supply function Q(ps) for the local supplier price ps. For the same
good, the foreign country has the corresponding demand and supply functions, D∗(p∗d) and
Q∗(p∗s), respectively, where asterisks denote foreign variables. All functions are positive and
twice-continuously diﬀerentiable.
To formalize the two key features stated above, the model is augmented in two respects.
First, a domestic production of the import good by the home country generates a posi-
tive externality within the border. Second, the home government has private information
about externality levels and thus about subsidy levels that are necessary to internalize the
production externality. In particular, we consider an incomplete-information model with a
continuum of possible externality types. Externality types are represented by the (marginal)
production externality, denoted by θ. Externality type θ is drawn from the support [0,θ]
according to the twice-continuously diﬀerentiable distribution function, F(θ),w h e r eθ>0.
The density is deﬁned as f(θ) ≡ F0(θ) where f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [0,θ]. Producers ignore
the external eﬀects of their production on the aggregate production, and thus their supply
f u n c t i o n sa r en o td i r e c t l ya ﬀected by θ. The aggregate value of the production externality
may then be represented by θQ(ps) for the home country with externality type θ.11
To deliver our main points simply, the model focuses on policy intervention by the home
government only in its import-competing sector. Instead, it allows for two policy instruments:
a domestic production subsidy, s,a n da ni m p o r tt a r i ﬀ, τ.12 We assume that all policy
instruments are non-prohibitive and expressed in speciﬁc terms. In the absence of policies
11The aggregate value of externality is similarly represented in Ederington (2002), Lee (2007) and Horn, Maggi and
Staiger (2010). A similar setting is commonly found in collusion literature where ﬁrms have private information
about their marginal production costs. For example, see Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008) and Athey, Bagwell
and Sanchirico (2004), Bagwell and Lee (2010) and Lee (2010).
12We can readily extend the model by assuming a symmetric structure: externality types are iid across sectors and the
foreign government also intervenes in its import sector.
9by the foreign government, the foreign consumer and supplier prices are equal to the world
(oﬀshore) price, pw: p∗s = p∗d = pw. The markets in two countries are integrated, and so a
foreign supplier receives the same price for sales in the foreign country that it receives for
sales in the home country after paying the tariﬀ: pw = pd−τ. The wedge between the home
supplier price and the home consumer price is the domestic subsidy: ps = pd + s.T h e s e
pricing equations may be rewritten in a useful form:
p
d = p
w + τ and p
s = p
w + τ + s. (1)









Plugging the consumer and supplier prices into the market-clearing condition, we may ﬁnd
the equilibrium world price b pw(s,τ). The equilibrium consumer and supplier prices may then
be written as b pd(s,τ)=b pw(s,τ)+τ and b ps(s,τ)=b pw(s,τ)+τ +s.I ti sa l s oi m m e d i a t ef r o m
t h ec o n d i t i o n( 2 )t h a t ,i ft h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n tr a i s e ss or τ, then it can lower the world











D0 − Q0 − (Q∗0 − D∗0)
< 0. (4)
As seen in the Appendix, an increase in s or τ promotes the home production of the foreign
export good, Q(b ps), and reduces the home import, D(b pd) − Q(b ps). Observe also that an
increase in s or τ imposes a negative terms-of-trade externality on the foreign welfare. The
policy change that lowers the world price (the foreign local prices) is harmful to the foreign
exporters and beneﬁcial to the foreign consumers. The beneﬁt to the foreign consumers
amounts to a transfer from the foreign producers to the foreign consumers. The net foreign
welfare decreases when the world price falls.
We now describe government preferences. The welfare function of each country is separa-
ble across import and export sectors; thus, we can again focus on the welfare function in the
home import sector which is the foreign export sector. The home welfare includes consumer
surplus, proﬁts, revenue from the import tariﬀ, expenditures on the production subsidies
and the aggregate value of the production externality. The home welfare for externality type
10θ is
W(s,τ;θ) ≡ CS(b p
d)+Π(b p
s)+τ · M(s,τ) − s · Q(b p
s)+θ · Q(b p
s), (5)
where M(s,τ) ≡ D(b pd) − Q(b ps). Consumer surplus and proﬁts are given by CS(b pd) ≡
R p
e pd D(p)dp and Π(b ps) ≡
R e ps
p Q(p)dp,w h e r ep =s u p {p : D(p) > 0} and p =i n f{p : Q(p) > 0}.
A policy mix selected by the home government aﬀects the foreign welfare through the world







The home government cares about the negative terms-of-trade externality on the foreign




It is noteworthy that the iso-welfare function for the home country, {(s,τ):W(s,τ;θ)=κ
for a constant κ},s a t i s ﬁes the single-crossing property: as we show in the Appendix, for
θ2 >θ 1, the iso-welfare function for θ2 crosses the iso-welfare function for θ1 from above only
once if it crosses.
2.2 First-Best and Nash Policies
T h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n tf a c e saﬁnite choice set {s | s :[ 0 ,θ] → R+}×{ τ | τ :[ 0 ,θ] → R+}
and selects a policy mix conditional on its externality type. A typical policy mix se-
lected by the home government with externality type θ may be denoted by (s(θ),τ(θ)).
Given the policy mix, the expected home welfare and expected global welfare may be
represented by EθW(s(θ),τ(θ);θ)=
R θ
0 W(s(θ),τ(θ);θ)dF(θ) and EθWG(s(θ),τ(θ);θ)=
R θ
0 WG(s(θ),τ(θ);θ)dF(θ), respectively.




E(θ)=0for all θ.( 8 )
In the ﬁrst-best policy mix, the home government selects its subsidy at the marginal exter-
nality and achieves zero tariﬀ. Assuming that W(s,τ;θ) is strictly concave in s and τ,w e
next characterize the (non-cooperative) Nash policy mix (sN(θ),τN(θ)) that maximizes the







for all θ,( 9 )
where b pw = b pw(s = sN(θ),τ = τN(θ)) and E∗(b pw)=Q∗(b pw) − D∗(b pw).14 In the Nash
policy mix, the home government selects its subsidy at the marginal externality and raises
its import tariﬀ above zero to capture the terms-of-trade gain. In fact, the ﬁndings in (8) and
(9) require that the highest externality type θ should be below a certain level for government
intervention to be non-prohibitive.
For the agreements we explore below, we now make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. (i) W(s,τ;θ) and W∗(s,τ) are strictly concave in s and τ. (ii) M(s =
θ,τ =0 )> 0.
The assumption (i) is satisﬁed for a large family of demand and supply functions, includ-
ing linear functions. This assumption implies that the global welfare WG(s,τ;θ) is also
strictly concave in s and τ. The assumption (ii) ensures that government intervention is
non-prohibitive for the policy mixes we consider below.
2.3 Objective of Agreement
In this paper, we consider the following stage game: (i) two governments write an agreement
that speciﬁes the policy set, (ii) the home government privately observes its own externality
types and (iii) the home government selects its policy mix from the policy set speciﬁed by
the agreement. This stage game indicates that, when arranging an agreement, governments
specify the policy set from which they can select their policy pairs. We assume that an
agreement is enforceable if and only if the associated policy set is incentive compatible:i f
the policy set is (not) incentive compatible, the agreement is (not) enforceable. A policy set
is incentive compatible if it is speciﬁed such that the home government with one externality
type must not gain from selecting the policy mix that is prescribed for this government when
it has a diﬀerent externality type. This incentive constraint is analogous to the standard
truth-telling constraint encountered in mechanism-design problems.
We say that an agreement is optimal when the associated policy set is incentive compatible







E∗(e pw) is the elasticity of the foreign country’s export supply.
12Formally, let (s(θ),τ(θ)) represent the policy mix selected by the home government with
type θ under the policy set {(s,τ)},a n dl e t(e s(θ),e τ(θ)) denote the policy mix selected by
the home government with type θ under an alternative policy set {(e s, e τ)}.A na g r e e m e n ti s
optimal if its policy set {(s,τ)} is incentive compatible,





for any incentive compatible policy set {(e s, e τ)}.15 Equivalently, an agreement is not optimal
if there exists an alternative policy set in which the expected global welfare is higher than
in the original set and the incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed.
2.4 Incentive Problem
The starting point of our analysis is to identify a central incentive problem contained in our
model. We emphasize that the incentive problem is standard and is commonly observed on
theoretical and actual policy levels. We begin with a hypothetical agreement in which the
policy set is given by:16
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s = θ,τ =0 ) }. (10)
T h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n tw i t he x t e r n a l i t yt y p eθ then selects the policy mix that maximizes
W(s,τ;θ) under the policy set (10). Since the world price is constant at b pw(s = θ,τ =0 )for
any (s,τ) in the set, the foreign welfare W∗(s,τ) is constant. Given that an increase in s or τ
lowers the world price, the policy set (10) can be uniquely represented by an iso-world-price




D0 − Q0[s − θ]. (11)




D0−Q0 < 0, is given by (3) and (4). Along this function, having no incentive to use its
15Incentive compatibility of {(h s, h τ)} can be written as W(h s(θ),h τ(θ);θ) ≥ W(h s(e θ),h τ(e θ);θ) for all θ and e θ 6= θ.
16Assumption 1 (ii), M(s = θ,τ =0 )> 0, indicates that government intervention is non-prohibitive for any
(s,τ) along the iso-world price function (10) where the trade volume, represented by E
∗(e p
w), is constant. Further,
since E
∗(e p
w) increases in e p
w, government intervention is non-prohibitive for any (s,τ) in the region {(s,τ):e p
w(s,τ) ≥
e p
w(s = θ,τ =0 ) } under the assumption.
13subsidy and manipulate terms of trade, the home government uses the ﬁrst-best instrument
to internalize the production externality at the margin. We formalize this ﬁnding.
Lemma 1. In the policy set (10), the home government’s subsidy choice satisﬁes s(θ)=θ
for all θ.
The proof is in the Appendix. Given s(θ)=θ, the home government with externality type
θ selects τsep(θ) from the iso-world-price function τ = τsep(s). Thus, the policy set (10) acts
as a “sorting” (separating) scheme that elicits a truthful revelation of all externality types.
Lemma 1 leads to additional points. Consider ﬁrst an alternative policy set in which tariﬀs
are now ﬁxed and close or equal to zero for all θ. This alternative policy set raises a central
incentive problem: subsequent to a tariﬀ-reduction commitment, the home government has
incentive to raise its subsidy for the protective purpose. Under the alternative policy set,
if the home government neglects foreign exporters and raises its subsidy, then it can lower
the world price of the foreign export good and thus bring a terms-of-trade gain (loss) to
the home (foreign) country. In practice, this concern has been a justiﬁcation of the WTO’s
continuing attempts to regulate the use of domestic subsidies. Consider next another policy
set in which the world price is constant at b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) :
{(s1,τ1),(s2,τ2)} where b p
w(s1,τ1)=b p
w(s2,τ2)=b p
w(s = θ,τ =0 ) . (12)
Since the policy set (12) includes only two possible choices, it entails pooling for some types.
We can infer from Lemma 1 that the home welfare is higher in (10) than in (12) if θ/ ∈ {s1,s 2}.
We can generalize this point.
Lemma 2. For all θ, the home welfare is at least as high in (10) as in any policy set where
t h ew o r l dp r i c ei sc o n s t a n ta tb pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) .
Lemma 1 and 2 hold at a general level where the policy set (10) is modiﬁed to
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s = θ,τ = κ) for a constant κ ≥ 0}. (13)
By changing κ, we may develop many sorting schemes in which s(θ)=θ.S u p p o s e t h a tκ
increases from zero and so the iso-world-price function shifts up from (10). Subsidy choice
then remains the same, s(θ)=θ,a n di m p o r tt a r i ﬀs rise along the new sorting scheme. Thus,
for each type θ, the world price falls and at the same time, the foreign welfare and the global
14welfare fall.17 The eﬀect of an increase in κ on the home welfare is less clear; it depends on
the initial level of κ and parameters. We now assume that, if κ increases slightly from zero,
then the home welfare increases for all θ.
Assumption 2. For all θ,a ni n c r e a s ei nκ from zero in the set (13) increases the home
welfare.
This assumption is satisﬁed if and only if tariﬀs are lower in the set (10) than in the Nash
policies: τsep(θ) <τ N(θ) for all θ. This inequality holds for a large family of demand and
supply functions, if θ is below a certain level and the term
E∗(e pw)
E∗0(e pw) in (9) is suﬃciently large.
Indeed,
E∗(e pw)
E∗0(e pw) is large when the home country is large and has a signiﬁcant incentive to
manipulate terms of trade. Assumption 2 ensures that the central incentive problem stated
above occurs in the region {(s,τ):b pw(s,τ) ≥ b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) }: for any policy mix in the
region (below the Nash policies), there exists some θ f o rw h i c ht h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n th a s
incentive to raise its subsidy and bring a terms-of-trade gain to the home country.
3 Suboptimal Agreement
In this section, we explore three diﬀerent hypothetical agreements: (i) a separating agreement
in which the home government uses the ﬁrst-best intervention to internalize the externality
margin, (ii) a pooling agreement in which policy choices are fully rigid (state-independent)
and (iii) an agreement in which tariﬀs are bound to zero with adjustments of restrictions on
subsidy choice. We show that none of these agreements are optimal. The ﬁndings established
below are quite general, in that they hold for any distribution function F.18
3.1 Separating Agreement
In this subsection, we consider a (full) separating agreement in which the home govern-
ment uses the ﬁrst-best instrument, s(θ)=θ, to internalize the production externality.
The policy set speciﬁed by the agreement must satisfy the incentive compatibility: θ =
argmaxs W(s,τ;θ) for all (s,τ) in the policy set. While looking for incentive compatible
17This part of proof is detailed in the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
18Our main ﬁndings established in this and next sections are founded on quite standard features: (i) the home
and foreign welfare functions are strictly concave in s and τ and (ii) along an iso-welfare function, having no incentive to
manipulate the terms of trade, the home government selects its subsidy at the marginal externality.
15policy sets, governments would contemplate the tariﬀ schedule, τ(θ), to maximize the ex-
pected global welfare.
Two ﬁndings can be established to maximize the expected global welfare. First, among
t h ep o l i c ys e t si nw h i c ht h ew o r l dp r i c ei sc o n s t a n ta tb pw(s = θ,τ = κ) where κ ≥ 0,t h e
policy set that entails full sorting is preferred to any policy set that entails a partial or full
pooling. This result is immediate from our previous argument. Second, among the policy
sets that entail full sorting, the policy set in which the world price is higher is preferred
to the policy set in which the world price is lower. This result directly follows from the
policy set (13): if the iso-world-price function shifts up as κ rises, then the global welfare
WG(s(θ),τ(θ);θ) decreases for all θ. These two ﬁndings lead to the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The expected global welfare is at least as high in the policy set (10) as in any
policy set in the region {(s,τ):b pw(s,τ) ≤ b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) }.
The separating agreement with the policy set (10) has strength and weakness.19 The
agreement uses the ﬁrst-best intervention to address the market imperfection. The home
government is granted the freedom to select any policy mix as long as its policy choices
preserve the world price at b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) . This freedom ensures that the home govern-
ment, having no incentive to manipulate terms of trade, selects the Pigouvian subsidy that
internalizes the production externality at the margin. The agreement, however, entails the
u s eo fh i g hi m p o r tt a r i ﬀs especially for low externality types. Governments may thus look
for some way to keep the subsidy-eﬃciency advantage while reducing tariﬀs by developing
another policy set that is strictly decreasing and is ﬂatter than the function τ = τsep(s).
This new policy set, however, induces lower-externality types to mimic higher-externality
types and raise their subsidies. Hence, the (global) welfare gain associated with the ﬁrst-
best intervention can be enjoyed only if the welfare loss associated with the “informational
cost” in the form of high import tariﬀs is also experienced.20 This ﬁnding indicates that the
policy set (10) acts as the best full sorting scheme.
19Given that τ
sep(θ) <τ
N(θ) for all θ under Assumption 2, the agreement with the policy set (10) strictly improves
on the (non-cooperative) Nash policies.
20Consider any alternative agreement in which the policy set is represented by a decreasing function τ = τ
alt(s) that
is ﬂatter than τ = τ
sep(s) for all s. We can show that this alternative agreement is not optimal. The limiting
case is that tariﬀs are bound to zero for all θ. As we show below, this agreement in the limiting case is not optimal.




c,τ =0 )for θ
c ∈ (0,θ)}. (14)
This policy set grants the home government the freedom to select any policy mix as long
as its policy choice preserves the world price at b pw(s = θ
c,τ =0 )> b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) ,
while it restricts subsidy choice to s ≤ θ
c.F o r a l l θ<θ
c, it entails sorting: s(θ)=θ
and τ(θ) <τ sep(θ).F o r a l l θ ≥ θ
c, it entails pooling at the policy mix (θ
c,0). Observing
that, if θ
c → θ, then the alternative agreement approaches the separating agreement, we
diﬀerentiate the expected global welfare under the alternative agreement with respect to
θ
c. We then establish that the separating agreement can be improved on by an alternative
agreement that entails pooling at the top (i.e., the interval of θ adjoining the highest type
θ). Intuitively, if θ
c falls slightly from θ, then the alternative agreement decreases import
tariﬀs along the new sorting scheme while keeping the pooling at (θ
c,0) close to the eﬃcient
policy mix (θ,0) for θ ∈ [θ
c,θ].
Proposition 1. A separating agreement in which subsidy choice satisﬁes s(θ)=θ for all θ
is not optimal: it can be improved on by an alternative agreement that entails pooling at
the top.
T h ep r o o fi si nt h eA p p e n d i x . P r o p o s i t i o n1s h o w st h a tn oo p t i m a la g r e e m e n ta d h e r e s
strictly to the targeting principle in its subsidy choice. If an agreement uses the ﬁrst-best
instrument to remedy the market failure that leads to under-production in the import-
competing sector, then it entails the use of high import tariﬀs which additionally stimulates
domestic production and thus results in excessive import protection. This ﬁnding indicates
that any optimal agreement entails at least partial pooling: it restricts the use of ﬁrst-best
intervention at least for some θ in order to reduce import tariﬀs and raise the world price
and import volume.
3.2 Tariﬀ Liberalization and Restriction on Subsidy Choice
In this subsection, we consider the possibility that an agreement may save the informational
cost in the form of import tariﬀs by imposing a restriction on subsidy choice. We ﬁrst explore
a pooling agreement in which policy choices are fully rigid. The policy set can then be rep-
resented by a point, (sp,τp),w h e r esp and τp are constant. Incentive compatibility is trivial
17and is apparently satisﬁed. The optimal pooling agreement maximizes the expected global
welfare EθWG(sp,τp;θ). Since all equilibrium prices are constant for θ in this agreement, it








The optimal pooling agreement is thus characterized by sp = E[θ] and τp =0 .W es h o wt h a t
this agreement can be improved on by an alternative agreement that entails sorting at the
bottom (i.e., the interval of θ adjoining the lowest type 0). An alternative policy set is
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s = E[θ],τ =0 ) }. (16)
The alternative agreement extends the original policy set from a point (E[θ],0) to the set (16)
while preserving the original world price b pw(s = E[θ],τ =0 ) . It entails sorting for θ ≤ E[θ]
and pooling at the point (E[θ],0) for θ>E[θ]. Since the policy-set extension preserves the
original world price, the associated home-welfare improvement does not impose a negative
terms-of-trade eﬀect on the foreign producers. Hence, the expected global welfare is higher
in the alternative agreement than in the original agreement.
We next augment this ﬁnding and consider the possibility that an agreement may tailor
the degree to which the use of subsidy is regulated, together with a commitment to zero
tariﬀ. This possibility occurs when governments adjust the degree of restrictions on subsidy
choice, in order to maximize the beneﬁts of their tariﬀ liberalization. Since an optimal policy
set is not a singleton by Proposition 2, we begin with the policy set {(s1,0),(s2,0)} where
s1 and s2 are constant and s2 >s 1.W er e s t r i c tt h es u b s i d ys1 to satisfy s1 < θ.I fs1 ≥ θ,
then the policy set is in the region {(s,τ):b pw(s,τ) ≤ b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) }.B y L e m m a 3
and Proposition 1, the agreement is not optimal. We also assume that both policy mixes
are selected by at least some θ; the policy set would otherwise be equivalent to a singleton
in which case the agreement is not optimal. We can then show that this agreement is not
optimal, whether s1 > 0 or s1 =0 .F o rt h eﬁr s tc a s e( s1 > 0), we may develop an alternative
policy set that has two subsets:
{{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s = s1,τ =0 ) },(s2,0)}. (17)
The ﬁrst subset is extended from a point (s1,0).S i n c eb pw(s = s1,τ =0 )> b pw(s = s2,τ =0 ) ,
the policy-set extension preserves the higher world price and so does not cause a decrease
in the world price for any θ. The associated home-welfare improvement does not impose
18an e g a t i v et e r m s - o f - t r a d ee ﬀect on the foreign producers, which indicates that the original
agreement is not optimal. For the second case (s1 =0 ), as we show in the Appendix, we
may develop an alternative policy set under two possibilities: (i) (0,0) is selected only by
the lowest type 0 and (ii) (0,0) is selected by types θ ∈ [0,b θ] for some b θ>0.
Governments may further reduce the degree of restrictions on subsidy choice by oﬀering
more subsidy options. We can show that an agreement with {(s1,0),(s2,0),...,(sK,0)} is
not optimal, by applying the previous argument to the ﬁrst two choices, (s1,0) and (s2,0).
The limiting case is that subsidy choice is left to the home government’s discretion while
import tariﬀsa r eb o u n dt oz e r of o ra l lθ. The home government’ subsidy choice would then
be above a certain level, s > 0.W er e s t r i c tt h i sl e v e ls to satisfy s < θ.I fs ≥ θ,t h e na l l
policy choices are made in the region {(s,τ):b pw(s,τ) ≤ b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) }.L e m m a3a n d
Proposition 1 then imply that the agreement in the limiting case is not optimal. We now
develop an alternative policy set that has two parts:
{{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s = s,τ =0 ) },{(s,τ):s ∈ [s,θ] and τ =0 }}. (18)
The ﬁrst subset is extended from a point (s,0), and the second subset represents the dis-
cretionary choice for any subsidy s ∈ [s,θ] under zero tariﬀ. Observe that, for some θ<s ,
the policy-set extension increases the home welfare while it preserves the highest world price
b pw(s = s,τ =0 )in the original set.21 Hence, the agreement in the limiting case is not
optimal.
Based on our discussion to this point, we state the following proposition:
Proposition 2. A pooling agreement in which policy choices are fully rigid is not optimal: it
can be improved on by an alternative agreement that entails sorting at the bottom. Moreover,
regardless of the degree to which the use of subsidy is regulated, an agreement in which import
tariﬀs are bound to zero for all θ is not optimal: it can be improved on by an alternative
a g r e e m e n tt h a te n t a i l ss o r t i n ga tt h eb o t t o m .
In summary, when contemplating an agreement, governments face a tension between the
objective of promoting domestic eﬃciency and the objective of reducing import tariﬀs. In
the suboptimal agreements stated above, one objective is overly emphasized and is achieved
21We may extend our argument and show that an agreement is not optimal when the policy set includes some
line segments under zero tariﬀ such as {(s,τ):s ∈ {[s1,s1],...,[sK,sK]} and τ =0 }.
19at the expense of the other objective. Proposition 1 considers an agreement in which im-
port tariﬀs are adjusted to utilize the ﬁrst-best intervention with which to internalize the
externality margin. This agreement can be improved on by an alternative agreement that
entails pooling at the top. Proposition 2 explores an agreement in which the degree of re-
strictions on subsidy choice is tailored to maximize the beneﬁts of zero-tariﬀ commitment.
This agreement can also be improved on by an alternative agreement that entails sorting at
the bottom.
4 Optimal Agreement
In this section, we investigate how an optimal agreement resolves the tension between the
objective of promoting domestic eﬃciency and the objective of reducing import tariﬀs. We
ﬁrst conﬁrm that any optimal agreement entails sorting at the bottom and pooling at the top.
We next show that any optimal agreement restricts the home government’s subsidy choice
and thus its use of ﬁrst-best intervention. In this way, an optimal agreement respects terms
of trade for the foreign country and increases the market-access level for foreign exporters.
4.1 Sorting at the Bottom
In this subsection, we conﬁrm that any optimal agreement entails sorting at the bottom,
[0,θ c]. We proceed to present two monotonicity results. We ﬁrst show that s(θ) is nonde-
creasing in θ. Suppose that an agreement allows s(θ2) <s (θ1) for some θ2 >θ 1. Incentive
compatibility of type θ1 implies that (s(θ2),τ(θ2)) must be located in the region:
{(s,τ):W(s,τ;θ1) ≤ W(s(θ1),τ(θ1);θ1) and s<s (θ1)}. (19)
We then use the single-crossing property: the iso-welfare function for θ2 that crosses the
point (s(θ1),τ(θ1)) also crosses the iso-welfare function for θ1 from above only once. Any
policy mix in (19) is thus less preferred to (s(θ1),τ(θ1)) for type θ2, which violates incentive
compatibility.22
We next show that, in any optimal agreement, the world price is nonincreasing in θ:
b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) ≤ b pw(s(θ1),τ(θ1)) for θ2 >θ 1.S u p p o s et h a t ,i na na g r e e m e n t ,t y p eθ1 (type
θ2) involves the highest world price for all θ ≤ θ1 (for all θ>θ 1)a n db pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) >
22Incentive compatibility also implies that the domestic production of import good, Q, is nondecreasing in θ.
20b pw(s(θ1),τ(θ1)).23 We develop an alternative policy set in which a sorting scheme at the
bottom extends up to the policy mix that maximizes the world price on the iso-welfare
function for type θ2, {(s,τ):W(s,τ;θ2)=W(s(θ2),τ(θ2);θ2)}.T h e nt y p e sθ ≤ θ2 do not
mimic types θ>θ 2 but selects their policy mixes along the sorting scheme. The incentive of
types θ>θ 2 to mimic types θ ≤ θ2 can be ignored: the potential home-welfare gain by types
θ>θ 2 from mimicking types θ ≤ θ2 does not cause a deterioration in the foreign country’s
terms of trade, since the sorting scheme at the bottom involves the world price that is at
least as high as b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)). Thus, inclusion of the sorting scheme for θ ≤ θ2 increases
the expected global welfare, which indicates that the original agreement is not optimal. We
summarize the monotonicity results.
Lemma 4. (i) Subsidy choice is nondecreasing in θ. (ii) In any optimal agreement, the
world price is nonincreasing in θ.
We next show that, in any optimal agreement, the policy choice by the lowest type 0,
(s(0),τ(0)),i si nt h er e g i o n :
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ) > b p
w(s = θ,τ =0 ) }. (20)
If an agreement is optimal and allows b pw(s(0),τ(0)) ≤ b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) ,t h e nL e m m a4
implies that b pw(s(θ),τ(θ)) ≤ b pw(s = θ,τ =0 )for all θ ∈ [0,θ]. Lemma 3 and Proposition
1, in turn, indicate that the agreement is not optimal. The policy choice by the lowest
type can be further speciﬁed: in any optimal agreement, s(0) = 0 and τ(0) > 0 and thus
b pw(s(0),τ(0)) < b pw(s =0 ,τ =0 ) . If an agreement allows s(0) > 0,t h e nw em a yd e v e l o p




w(s(0),τ(0)) for s ≤ s(0)}. (21)
The policy set for s>s (0) remains the same. The policy-set extension in (21) increases the
home welfare for some θ ∈ [0,s(0)].S i n c eb pw(s(0),τ(0)) ≥ b pw(s(θ),τ(θ)) for all θ>0 by
Lemma 4, the associated home-welfare gain does not cause a decrease in the world price for
any θ. Hence, the agreement with s(0) > 0 is not optimal. Given s(0) = 0,i fa na g r e e m e n t
allows τ(0) = 0, we may then explore two possibilities: (i) (0,0) is selected only by the lowest
type 0 and (ii) (0,0) is selected by types θ ∈ [0,b θ]. A similar procedure used in the proof
23The proof is provided in greater detail in the Appendix.
21of Proposition 2 conﬁrms that the agreement with (s(0),τ(0)) = (0,0) is not optimal. We
summarize the results.
Lemma 5. In any optimal agreement, the policy mix for type 0, (s(0),τ(0)), is in the region
(20) and satisﬁes s(0) = 0 and τ(0) > 0.
We are now ready to show that any optimal agreement entails sorting at the bottom,
[0,θ c]. Assume that an agreement is optimal and entails pooling for θ ∈ [0,b θ] at (sp,τp).
L e m m a5t h e ni m p l i e st h a t(sp,τp) is in the region (20) and satisﬁes sp =0and τp > 0.
We can then develop an alternative agreement in which a sorting interval at the bottom
extends up to the policy mix that maximizes the world price on the iso-welfare function for
type b θ, {(s,τ):W(s,τ;b θ)=W(sp,τp;b θ)}. Then the home government with types θ ≤ b θ
does not mimic types above b θ. The incentive of types θ>b θ to mimic types θ ≤ b θ can be
ignored: since b pw(sp,τp) ≥ b pw(s(θ),τ(θ)) for all θ by Lemma 4, the potential home-welfare
gain by types θ>b θ from mimicking types θ ≤ b θ does not lower the world price for any
type. Inclusion of the sorting at the bottom for types θ ≤ b θ increases the home welfare,
without causing a deterioration in the foreign country’s terms of trade. Hence, the original
agreement is not optimal, which causes a contradiction.
Proposition 3. Any optimal agreement entails sorting at the bottom: there exists θc ∈ (0,θ)
such that the policy set entails sorting for θ ∈ [0,θc].
A formal proof is in the Appendix. As we characterize below, the sorting at the bottom
here is diﬀerent from the sorting at the bottom stated in Proposition 2 where the world price
is constant and s(θ)=θ. It is thus premature to conclude that, along the sorting scheme at
the bottom, the home government is granted the freedom to select any policy mix provided
that its policy choices do not impose a negative terms-of-trade externality on the foreign
country.
4.2 Pooling at the Top
In this subsection, we conﬁrm that any optimal agreement entails pooling at the top, [θ
c,θ].
We ﬁrst extend Lemma 5 and show that any policy mix with a positive tariﬀ is restricted
to the region (20) in any optimal agreement: for any θ,i fτ(θ) > 0,t h e nb pw(s(θ),τ(θ)) >
b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) . Assume that an agreement is optimal and τ(e θ) > 0 and b pw(s(e θ),τ(e θ)) ≤
22b pw(s = θ,τ =0 )for some e θ>0. Lemma 4 and 5 imply that there always exists a type b θ<e θ
where
b θ =s u p {θ : b p
w(s(θ),τ(θ)) > b p
w(s = θ,τ =0 ) }. (22)
Suppose that the iso-welfare function for type b θ, {(s,τ):W(s,τ;b θ)=W(s(b θ),τ(b θ);b θ)},
crosses the iso-world-price function, {(s,τ):b pw(s,τ)=b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) },f r o mb e l o wa ta
point (b s,b τ) where b τ>0 and (b s,b τ) 6=( s(b θ),τ(b θ)).24 W ed e v e l o pa na l t e r n a t i v ea g r e e m e n t
that includes a sorting scheme at the top from the point (b s,b τ):
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s = θ,τ =0 )for s ≥ b s}. (23)
The policy set for s<b s remains the same. The policy set (23) for s ≥ b s is arranged to make
type b θ indiﬀerent between (s(b θ),τ(b θ)) and (b s,b τ). The alternative agreement then entails
pooling for θ ∈ (b θ,b s)at (b s,b τ) and sorting for θ ∈ [b s,θ] along the iso-world-price function
(23). For all aﬀected types θ>b θ, the global welfare is at least as high in the alternative
agreement as in the original agreement. Intuitively, for θ ∈ (b θ,b s), the alternative agreement
involves a weakly lower domestic distortion in the form of “over-subsidy” (s(θ) >θ )a ta
weakly higher world price than does the original agreement, and for θ ∈ [b s,θ],t h ea l t e r n a t i v e
agreement involves sorting at a weakly higher world price than does the original agreement.
Further, we can develop another agreement in which the sorting scheme (23) shifts down to





c,τ =0 )for s ≥ b s
0}, (24)
where b s0 < b s. The policy set for s<b s0 remains the same. The policy set for s ≥ b s0 is arranged
to make type b θ indiﬀerent between (s(b θ),τ(b θ)) and (b s0,b τ
0). As in Proposition 1, when θ
c is
close to θ, the expected global welfare is higher in the new agreement than in the original
agreement. Hence, the original agreement is not optimal, which causes a contradiction.
Lemma 6. In any optimal agreement, any policy mix with a positive tariﬀ is restricted to
the region (20): {(s,τ):b pw(s,τ) > b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) }.
We next use Lemma 6 and establish two ﬁndings. First, any optimal agreement entails
pooling at the top, [θ
c,θ]. Assume that an agreement is optimal and entails sorting for
θ ∈ [b θ,θ]. The policy set for θ ∈ [b θ,θ] cannot be placed within the region (20), since any
24In the Appendix, Proof of Lemma 6 considers all other possibilities.
23sorting scheme within the region (20) causes pooling at the top. Outside the region (20),
however, any sorting scheme at the top involves positive tariﬀs. Lemma 6 then indicates
that the original agreement is not optimal. Second, any optimal agreement uses zero tariﬀ
i nt h ep o o l i n ga tt h et o p :τ(θ)=0for all θ ∈ [θ
c,θ]. Assume that an agreement is optimal
and entails pooling for θ ∈ [b θ,θ] at (sp,τp) with a positive tariﬀ τp > 0.L e m m a 6 t h e n
implies that (sp,τp) is in the region (20). We consider an alternative policy set that includes
a sorting scheme from the point (sp,τp):
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(sp,τp) for all s ≥ sp}. (25)
The policy set for s<s p remains the same. The one endpoint of (25) is (sp,τp).T h e
other endpoint is on the zero-tariﬀ line and may be denoted by (s0,0). It follows that
sp <s 0.25 Lemma 4 implies that the original policy set for types θ<b θ is in the region
{(s,τ):b pw(s,τ) ≥ b pw(sp,τp) and s<s p}.I f t y p e s θ<b θ did not select (sp,τp) under
the original policy set, then they still prefer their original choices to any choice now under
the alternative set. The policy-set extension in (25) thus does not cause a fall in the world
price for any θ. Lemma 4 also implies that any policy mix (s,τ) for s<s p is in the region
{(s,τ):b pw(s,τ) ≥ b pw(sp,τp)};t y p e sθ ∈ (sp,s 0) then select their policy mixes along the
sorting scheme (25). Hence, inclusion of this sorting scheme increases the expected home
welfare, which indicates that the original agreement is not optimal. We now state the two
ﬁndings.
Proposition 4. Any optimal agreement entails pooling at zero tariﬀ at the top: there exists
θ
c ∈ [θc,θ) such that the policy set entails pooling at zero tariﬀ for θ ∈ [θ
c,θ].
In summary, Proposition 3 shows that sorting at the bottom is necessary to address
the market imperfection and promote domestic eﬃciency, while Proposition 4 shows that
pooling at the top is necessary to lower import tariﬀs and raise the world price and import
volume. An important policy implication of our ﬁndings is that the home government is
surely granted the use of a positive subsidy in any optimal agreement: probability of using
zero subsidy is zero under sorting at the bottom and continuous distribution F.T h e r e f o r e ,
the degree of restrictions on subsidy choice implied by our ﬁndings is far milder than the
25The inequality, sp <s 0, is immediate from e p
w(sp,τp)=e p
w(s = s0,τ =0 ) .
24de facto prohibition of domestic production subsidies seen in the legal environment under
WTO.
4.3 Restriction on Subsidy Choice
In this subsection, we develop general features that hold for the entire range of θ.Ad i ﬃculty
with characterizing an optimal policy set is that the world price may change over externality
levels. Our analysis therefore proceeds from the simplest policy set that conveys the two
features of an optimal agreement: sorting at the bottom and pooling at the top. This policy
set involves only one world price: the home government is then granted the freedom to select
any policy mix from the policy set that preserves the world price at a constant level. This




c,τ =0 ) }. (26)
We restrict attention to θ
c ∈ (0,θ), since optimality requires θ
c > 0 by Proposition 2 and
θ
c < θ by Proposition 1. The policy set entails sorting for θ ≤ θ
c and pooling at (θ
c,0) for
θ>θ
c. As noted above, the sorting scheme for θ ≤ θ
c has strength and weakness: it uses
the ﬁrst-best intervention to address the market imperfection and yet it entails the use of
high import tariﬀs.
We next develop an alternative agreement in which the policy set consists of two separate
subsets and includes a jump between the two. The jump is made from (s(θc),τ(θc)) to
(s(θ
c),τ(θ
c)) such that type θc <θ
c is indiﬀerent between the two choices.26 It follows that
types θ ∈ (θc,θ
c) pool at (s(θ
c),τ(θ
c)) and also that b pw(s(θc),τ(θc)) > b pw(s(θ
c),τ(θ
c)).27 In
particular, we consider the policy set in which the second subset is a singleton and endpoint
of the original sorting scheme (26) so that (s(θ
c),τ(θ
c)) = (θ
c,0). The alternative agreement
thus entails sorting for all θ ≤ θc along a new sorting scheme
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s(θc),τ(θc)) for s ≤ s(θc)} (27)
26Incentive compatibility implies that (s(θ
c),τ(θ
c)) is in the region {(s,τ):W(s,τ;θc) ≤ W(s(θc),τ(θc);θc)},







c);θc), then the expected global welfare can be increased by














27If θc is indiﬀerent between (s(θc),τ(θc)) and (s(θ
c),τ(θ
c)),t h e ne p




4i m p l i e se p
w(s(θc),τ(θc)) ≥ e p
w(s(θ
c),τ(θ
c)),a n di fe p
w(s(θc),τ(θc)) = e p
w(s(θ
c),τ(θ
c)),t h e nθc cannot be indiﬀerent
between the two diﬀerent choices.
25and pooling at the policy mix (θ
c,0) for all θ>θ c.
Let ∆(θ) ≡ WG
A(·;θ)−WG
O(·;θ),w h e r eWG
A(·;θ) and WG
O(·;θ) represent the global welfare
under the alternative and original agreements, respectively. The global welfare is aﬀected
for θ ≤ θc and for θ ∈ (θc,θ
c): the alternative agreement shifts the original sorting scheme
towards lower import tariﬀs and brings the (global) welfare gain, ∆(θ) > 0,f o rt y p e sθ ≤ θc,
b u ti tc a u s e st h ew e l f a r el o s s ,∆(θ) < 0, for those types θ ∈ (θc,θ
c) that newly pool at
(θ
c,0). Observing that the alternative policy set approaches the original set (26) as θc → θ
c,
we diﬀerentiate Eθ∆(θ) with respect to θc and show that the original agreement can be
improved on by the alternative agreement. If θc falls slightly from θ
c, then the marginal
welfare gain associated with the tariﬀ reduction for θ ≤ θc along the new sorting scheme is
strictly positive, but the marginal welfare loss associated with the new pooling for θ ∈ (θc,θ
c)
is close to zero, since this welfare loss is measured on the original iso-world-price function (26)
where the foreign welfare is held constant. Intuitively, along the original sorting scheme, the
original policy choices maximize the home welfare; the ﬁrst-order diﬀerentiation of the home
welfare at the original policy choices is zero. If θc approaches θ
c, then the new pooling point
approaches the original policy choices made for θ ∈ (θc,θ
c) along the original sorting scheme;
the ﬁrst-order diﬀerentiation of the home welfare at the new pooling point approaches zero.
The marginal home-welfare loss associated with the new pooling then approaches zero.
As we present in the Appendix, we may extend this result and show that no optimal
a g r e e m e n ti n c l u d e sas o r t i n gs c h e m e( a si t spo l i c ys u b s e t )i nw h i c ht h ew o r l dp r i c ei sc o n s t a n t .
This ﬁnding leads to two general points. First, along the sorting at the bottom seen in any
optimal agreement, the world price is strictly increasing in θ. The slope at any policy mix on
the sorting scheme is ﬂatter than the slope of the associated iso-world-price function other
than at the policy mix for the lowest type 0 w h e r et h et w os l o p e sa r et h es a m e ;t h u s ,s(0) = 0
and s(θ) >θfor θ ∈ (0,θ c). Second, in any optimal agreement, two diﬀerent policy mixes
deliver two diﬀerent terms of trade for foreign country. Suppose θ2 >θ 1 and (s(θ1),τ(θ1)) 6=
(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) in an optimal agreement. By Lemma 4, b pw(s(θ1),τ(θ1)) ≥ b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)).
Further, b pw(s(θ1),τ(θ1)) = b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) is impossible; if this equality holds, the expected
global welfare would then be maximized by including a sorting scheme between (s(θ1),τ(θ1))
and (s(θ2),τ(θ2)) in which the world price is constant. Hence, in any optimal agreement, if
θ2 >θ 1 and (s(θ1),τ(θ1)) 6=( s(θ2),τ(θ2)),t h e nb pw(s(θ1),τ(θ1)) > b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)).W en o w
26highlight this second point.
Proposition 5. In any optimal agreement, two diﬀerent policy mixes deliver two diﬀerent
terms of trade for the foreign country such that an increase (decrease) in domestic subsidy
deteriorates (improves) terms of trade for the foreign country.
We next present two additional points. First, in an optimal agreement, the sorting scheme
present at the bottom or potentially in other places may be short; an alternative agreement
would otherwise create the net global welfare gain by shifting the scheme towards lower tariﬀs
and including a new jump. The diﬀerence here is that the sorting scheme is no longer an
iso-world-price function; thus, the marginal welfare loss associated with the new pooling does
not approach zero. This result indicates that, for a wide range of θ, an optimal policy set may
consist of pooling points. Second, we can numerically conﬁrm that an agreement creates the
net global welfare gain when it shifts any iso-world-price function and includes a new jump.
Suppose that θ is uniformly distributed on [0,1] and that demand and supply functions are
linear: D(pd)=1 0− pd and Q(ps)=1
2ps for the home country and D∗(p∗d)=1 0− p∗d
and Q∗(p∗s)=p∗s for the foreign country.28 If an agreement involves only one world price
with no jump, then the optimal agreement within the class entails a sorting scheme (iso-
world-price function) for θ ∈ [0,0.68] and a pooling point (0.68,0). This agreement can
be improved on by an agreement that involves two world prices with one jump: a sorting
scheme for θ ∈ [0,0.478] and a pooling point (0.697,0). This alternative agreement can again
be improved on by another agreement that involves three world prices with two jumps: a
sorting scheme for θ ∈ [0,0.335] and two pooling points, (0.508,0.052) and (0.705,0).
We ﬁnally answer the question: for any θ, is the home government granted the freedom to
select any policy mix from the policy set that preserves the world price at a constant level?
Proposition 5 asserts that the home government is not granted the freedom in any optimal
agreement. An optimal agreement resolves the tension between the objective of promoting
domestic eﬃciency and the objective of reducing import tariﬀs only when it restricts the
home government’s subsidy choice and thus its use of ﬁrst-best intervention. In this way, an
optimal agreement respects terms of trade for the foreign country and increases the market-
access level for foreign exporters.
28We could numerically observe similar ﬁndings under diﬀerent forms of linear functions.
27In comparison with existing literature, our model conveys distinct policy implications.
Bagwell and Staiger (2006) show that the market-access focus of GATT rules is a proper
treatment of domestic subsidies: if market access is secured by the non-violation complaint
at the negotiated (eﬃcient) level, then negotiations with tariﬀs alone can achieve a policy
mix that is eﬃcient from a global perspective. The policy prescription implied by their
ﬁnding is that governments need to be granted the freedom to select any policy mix from the
policy set that preserves market access at the eﬃcient level. In particular, the non-violation
complaint plays an important role in achieving an eﬃcient policy mix in Bagwell and Staiger
(2001) when governments, subsequent to their tariﬀ negotiation, are allowed to adjust tariﬀs
to preserve market access at the negotiated level, and in Bagwell and Staiger (2006) when
governments, with tariﬀs bound by their negotiation, have suﬃcient policy redundancy to
keep market access at the negotiated level.
Our ﬁnding is founded on the standard features that are similarly contained in Bagwell and
Staiger (2001, 2006): a government, under a market-access commitment, has no incentive
to distort subsidy choice away from the eﬃcient level, and an essential factor that leads
to an ineﬃcient policy mix is an insuﬃcient consideration for the foreign country’s terms
of trade. In their model, the foreign country’s terms of trade are duly respected when an
agreement leads the home government to a ﬁrst-best intervention with which to address the
market imperfection. In our model, by contrast, the foreign country’s terms of trade are
duly respected when an agreement restricts the home government’s subsidy choice and its
use of ﬁrst-best intervention. Proposition 5 shows that an optimal policy set can be achieved
b yap o l i c y - m i xa g r e e m e n t ,n o tb yac o m m i t m e n tt oas p e c i ﬁc market-access level. Proper
restrictions on the use of domestic subsidies implied by our ﬁnding are clearly stricter than
what is implied by the non-violation complaint of GATT rules.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we investigate how a domestic subsidy is treated, when a government can
disguise its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention with which to address a
market imperfection in the import-competing sector. We show that any optimal agreement
permits the use of a positive domestic subsidy, but it restricts the home government’s freedom
to select domestic subsidy in order to increase the market-access level for foreign exporters.
28On the one hand, we show that restrictions on subsidy choice are necessary, and moreover,
proper restrictions are stricter than what is implied by the non-violation complaint of GATT
rules. In broad terms, this ﬁnding indicates that the diﬃculties with determining whether a
domestic subsidy is used as a legitimate or protective instrument may oﬀer an explanation for
the reason why the international trading system departs from the fairly tolerant treatment of
domestic subsidies shown under GATT rules. On the other hand, we argue that, despite such
necessary restrictions on subsidy choice, proper restrictions are far milder than the de facto
prohibition of domestic production subsidies seen in the legal environment under WTO.
6 Appendix A: Preliminary Results29
For here and later use, we ﬁrst show that the world price decreases in s and τ in equilibrium.











D0 − Q0 − (Q∗0 − D∗0)
< 0. (A2)
Letting E∗(b pw) ≡ Q∗(b pw)−D∗(b pw), we can also show that the domestic import decreases in


























(Q∗0 − D∗0)(D0 − Q0)
D0 − Q0 − (Q∗0 − D∗0)
< 0. (A4)
Using b ps = b pw + τ + s,w ec a nﬁnally show that the domestic production of import good







Q0(D0 − (Q∗0 − D∗0))









D0 − Q0 − (Q∗0 − D∗0)
> 0. (A6)









D0 − Q0 < 0. (A7)
29These lengthy Appendices are not all for publication; they can be substantially shortened.
29We then obtain two ﬁndings: (i) if the world price b pw(s,τ) is constant in a policy set, then
t h ei m p o r tv o l u m eM(s,τ) is also constant in that set and (ii) the slope dτ
ds is strictly negative
along the policy set.
First-best and Nash policies: With these results in place, we ﬁnd the ﬁrst-best and non-
cooperative policy choices. We ﬁrst ﬁnd (s,τ) that maximizes the global welfare WG(s,τ;θ).
Recall the pricing relationships: b pd(s,τ)=b pw(s,τ)+τ and b ps(s,τ)=b pw(s,τ)+τ+s. Observe
also that
dCS(e pd)
de pd = −D(b pd) and
dΠ(e ps)
de ps = Q(b ps), and similarly that
dCS∗(e pw)
de pw = −D∗(b pw) and
dΠ∗(e pw)


















The ﬁrst equation implies that, for any τ ≥ 0,i fs>θ ,t h e n
∂WG(s,τ;θ)
∂s < 0. Hence, s ≤ θ.
Given s ≤ θ, the second equation implies that, if τ>0,t h e n
∂WG(s,τ;θ)
∂τ < 0. Hence, τ =0 .I t
follows from the ﬁrst equation that, if τ =0 ,t h e ns = θ. Therefore, WG(s,τ;θ) is maximized
by τ =0and s = θ.W en e x tﬁnd (s,τ) that maximizes the home welfare W(s,τ;θ). Under

























These conditions are satisﬁed when














The equality for τ is given by (A1)-(A4).
Single-crossing property: We show that the single-crossing property holds in the iso-
w e l f a r ef u n c t i o nf o rt h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,{(s,τ):W(s,τ;θ)=κ for a constant κ}.T h e





















∂τ > 0 at any policy mix. Thus, for any θ1 and
θ2 where θ2 >θ 1, the iso-welfare function for θ2 crosses the iso-welfare function for θ1 from
above only once if it crosses. For instance, if demand and supply functions are linear, then
∂∇(θ)
∂θ remains the same for any θ.
7 Appendix B: Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .We show that the home government with externality type θ selects the
subsidy s = θ under the policy set in which b pw is constant. The policy set can be represented
by a decreasing function τ = τ(s) where τ0(s) < 0. The home welfare can thus be rewritten
as
W(s,τ(s);θ) ≡ CS(b p
d)+Π(b p
s)+τ(s) · M(s,τ(s)) − s · Q(b p




d = b p
w(s,τ(s)) + τ(s) and b p




de pd = −D(b pd) and
dΠ(e ps)










































The RHS of (A8) is then reduced to the last term:
∂W(s,τ(s);θ)
∂s










=[ θ − s]
Q0D0
D0 − Q0.( A 9 )




∂s < 0 for s>θ
and
∂W(s,τ(s);θ)
∂s > 0 for s<θ . Hence, the home government with externality type θ selects
the subsidy s = θ under the policy set in which b pw is constant. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3. In the sorting scheme (13), if κ rises from zero, the subsidy choice
remains the same at s(θ)=θ while τ(θ) rises for all θ. Thus, a slight increase in κ from zero
lowers the world price for all θ, which in turn decreases the foreign welfare for all θ:
dW∗(s,τ)







31The last inequality is given by the assumption 1 (ii), M(s = θ,τ =0 )> 0.F u r t h e r ,g i v e n






< 0 for any τ>0.
Hence, if κ rises from zero, then the global welfare falls for all θ. ¥





c,τ =0 ) } where θ
c < θ. (A10)







D0 − Q0[s − θ
c] > 0, (A11)
where the slope, dτ
ds =
Q0
D0−Q0 < 0, is determined by (A1) and (A2). This agreement entails
pooling for θ ≥ θ
c: for all θ ∈ [θ
c,θ],s (θ)=θ
c and τ(θ)=0 . It also involves sorting for
θ<θ
c: for all θ ∈ [0,θ
c), s(θ)=θ and the tariﬀ choice τ(θ) is determined by the function
















c) by construction, diﬀerentiation of (A12)
with respect to θ













c increases, then the function τ(s) in (A11) shifts up and thus for all θ ∈ [0,θ
c),t h e
tariﬀ choice τ(θ) rises while s(θ)=θ. With this subsidy choice for θ ∈ [0,θ
c),w eﬁnd the

























The third equality is given by (A11). The ﬁrst term of (A13) is thus negative. We next
show that the second term of (A12) is positive. In the pooling interval, if θ
c rises, then the
32subsidy choice s(θ)=θ
c rises given the tariﬀ choice τ(θ)=0 .W i t h t h i s t a r i ﬀ choice for
θ ∈ [θ








c > 0 for θ>θ
c. (A15)
If θ
c → θ, then (A15) approaches zero while (A14) remains strictly negative: if θ
c decreases
slightly from θ, then the expected global welfare in (A12) increases. Hence, the separating
agreement can be improved upon by the alternative agreement that entails pooling at the
top for θ ∈ [θ
c,θ]. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . We here show that an agreement is not optimal when the
policy set is {(s1,0),(s2,0)} where s1 =0 . We consider two possibilities: (i) (0,0) is selected
only by the lowest type 0 and (ii) (0,0) is selected by types θ ∈ [0,b θ] where b θ>0.W eﬁrst
show that the agreement under (i) can be improved on by an alternative agreement in which
the policy set is the sorting scheme:
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s = s2,τ =0 ) }. (A16)
This agreement entails sorting for θ ≤ s2 and pooling at (s2,0) for θ>s 2. We assume s2 < θ;
if s2 ≥ θ, then it is immediate from the argument below to show that the agreement under
(i) is not optimal. For the lowest type 0, the global welfare is higher in the original choice
(0,0) than in (A16). For types θ ∈ (0,s 2), however, the global welfare is higher in (A16)
than in the original choice (s2,0): inclusion of a sorting scheme in (A16) increases the home
welfare while preserving the world price b pw(s = s2,τ =0 ) .S i n c eprob(θ =0 )=0under the
continuous distribution F, the expected global welfare is higher in the alternative agreement
than in the original agreement. We next show that the agreement under (ii) is not optimal.
We pick a subsidy b s ∈ (0,b θ) and develop an alternative policy set {(b s,0),(s2,0)}.T h i ss e t
entails pooling for θ ∈ [0,b θ] at (b s,0):s i n c e(0,0) and (s2,0) are indiﬀerent for type b θ in the
original set, it is immediate that (b s,0) is preferred to (s2,0) for types θ ≤ b θ in the alternative
set. This alternative set also motivates some types θ>b θ to mimic lower types and select
(b s,0). The associated home-welfare gain by those types from mimicking lower types raises
t h ew o r l dp r i c ea n dt h u st h ef o r e i g nw e l f a r ef o rt h o s et y p e s .I tt h u ss u ﬃces to show that the
global welfare over the range [0,b θ) is higher in the alternative agreement than in the original











where sp is constant for θ ∈ [0,b θ). The term on the LHS is maximized when sp =
R e θ
0 θdF(θ).
We can always set b s =
R e θ
0 θdF(θ) in the alternative agreement. Further, this alternative
agreement can be improved on by another agreement that entails sorting at the bottom:
{{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s = b s,τ =0 ) },(s2,0)}.
Hence, an agreement with the policy set {(s1,0),(s2,0)} is not optimal. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 .We here show that, in any optimal agreement, b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) ≤
b pw(s(θ1),τ(θ1)) for any θ2 >θ 1. Assume that an agreement is optimal and b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) >
b pw(s(θ1),τ(θ1)) for some θ2 >θ 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that there exists
type θc ∈ [0,θ1) such that b pw(s(θc),τ(θc)) ≥ b pw(s(θ),τ(θ)) for all θ ∈ [0,θ],a n da l s ot h a t
b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) ≥ b pw(s(θ),τ(θ)) for any θ>θ c. The monotonicity of subsidy choice then
implies
s(θc) ≤ s(θ1) ≤ s(θ2).
Deﬁne (s2,τ2) as the policy mix that maximizes b pw(s,τ) subject to the set:
{(s,τ):W(s,τ;θ2)=W(s(θ2),τ(θ2);θ2)}. (A17)
The world price within (A17) is maximized, when the iso-world-price function, {(s,τ):
b pw(s,τ)=κ for a constant κ>0}, shifts down either (a) until it is tangent to (A17) or (b)
until it crosses (A17) from below at zero tariﬀ. It then follows that
s(θ1) <s 2 ≤ θ2.
The second inequality is immediate: s2 = θ2 under (a) and s2 <θ 2 under (b). To show
that the ﬁrst inequality holds, suppose s2 ≤ s(θ1). By the monotonicity, s2 ≤ s(θ1) ≤
s(θ2).G i v e n t h a t (s2,τ2) and (s(θ2),τ(θ2)) a r el o c a t e do nt h et h es a m ei s o - w e l f a r ef u n c -
tion for θ2 in (A17), the above assumption, b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) > b pw(s(θ1),τ(θ1)), implies that
(s(θ1),τ(θ1)) is preferred to (s(θ2),τ(θ2)) for type θ2, which violates incentive compatibility.
Hence, s2 >s (θ1) holds. We below develop an alternative agreement under two cases: (i)
b pw(s(θc),τ(θc)) ≤ b pw(s2,τ2) and (ii) b pw(s(θc),τ(θc)) > b pw(s2,τ2).
34Case (i): We develop an alternative policy set that includes a sorting scheme at the bottom
up to the point (s2,τ2):
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s2,τ2) for all s ≤ s2}. (A18)
The policy set for s>s 2 remains the same as in the original agreement. We ﬁrst show that
incentive compatibility for types θ ≤ s2 holds. The policy mix (s2,τ2) is in the set (A17)
and any policy mix for s>s 2 is in the region {(s,τ):W(s,τ;θ2) ≤ W(s(θ2),τ(θ2);θ2)}.
Given s2 ≤ θ2 as shown above, types θ ≤ s2 do not mimic types θ>s 2 and their policy
choices are made along the set (A18); hence, s(θ)=θ for all θ ≤ s2.W e n e x t s h o w t h a t
incentive compatibility for θ>s 2 can be ignored: if some types θ>s 2 have incentive to
mimic types θ ≤ s2, then the associated home-welfare increase does not lower the foreign
welfare for any θ,s i n c et h es o r t i n gs c h e m e( A 1 8 )i n v o l v e st h eh i g h e s tp o s s i b l ew o r l dp r i c e
b pw(s2,τ2). Therefore, in order to show that the alternative agreement improves the expected
global welfare, it suﬃces to show that, for the range [0,s 2], the global welfare is higher in













O(·;θ) represent the global welfare under the alternative and original
agreements, respectively. Observe that the sorting scheme (A18) extends beyond the point
(s(θ1),τ(θ1)) at the world price b pw(s2,τ2) > b pw(s(θ1),τ(θ1)),g i v e ns(θ1) <s 2 as shown
above and the assumption b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) > b pw(s(θ1),τ(θ1)). This result ensures that, in
the original agreement, some types θ ∈ [0,s 2] selected their policies not from the sorting
s c h e m e( A 1 8 )b u tf r o mt h er e g i o ni nw h i c ht h ew o r l dp r i c ei sl o w e rt h a nb pw(s2,τ2).T h u s ,
inclusion of the sorting scheme (A18) increases the global welfare for the range [0,s 2] and so
the original agreement is not optimal, which causes a contradiction.
Case (ii): In this case, the iso-world-price function, {(s,τ):b pw(s,τ)=b pw(s2,τ2)}, crosses
the iso-welfare function for θc, {(s,τ):W(s,τ;θc)=W(s(θc),τ(θc);θc)}.W ec a nt h e nd e ﬁne
the crossing point as the policy mix (sc,τc) that satisﬁes
b p
w(sc,τc)=b p
w(s2,τ2) and W(sc,τc;θc)=W(s(θc),τ(θc);θc) where sc >θ c.
We next observe that
θc <s c <s (θ1) <s 2 ≤ θ2. (A19)
35All inequalities are given above other than the inequality, sc <s (θ1). This inequality holds
since (s(θ1),τ(θ1)) satisﬁes
W(s(θ1),τ(θ1);θc) ≤ W(sc,τc;θc)=W(s(θc),τ(θc);θc) (A20)
b p
w(s(θ1),τ(θ1)) < b p
w(sc,τc)=b p
w(s2,τ2).
The ﬁrst inequality is incentive compatibility of θc. The second inequality is given by the
above assumption, b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) > b pw(s(θ1),τ(θ1)),a n dt h ed e ﬁnition of (s2,τ2) which
implies b pw(s2,τ2) ≥ b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)).




w(s2,τ2) for all s ∈ [sc,s 2]}. (A21)
The policy set for s/ ∈ [sc,s 2] remains the same as in the original agreement. This sort-
ing scheme involves the highest possible world price for all θ>θ c,s i n c eb pw(s2,τ2) ≥
b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) and b pw(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) ≥ b pw(s(θ),τ(θ)) for any θ>θ c. W en e x tc h e c ki n -
centive compatibility of the alternative agreement. This agreement is arranged to make
type θc indiﬀerent between (s(θc),τ(θc)) and (sc,τc) and thus, types θ ∈ (θc,s c) pool
at (sc,τc). We also know that (s2,τ2) is in (A17) and the policy set for s>s 2 is in
{(s,τ):W(s,τ;θ2) ≤ W(s(θ2),τ(θ2);θ2)}.T h u s , g i v e n s2 ≤ θ2,t y p e sθ ∈ [sc,s 2] do not
mimic types θ>s 2 and their choices are made from the sorting scheme (A21).
We ﬁnally show that, for the aﬀected range (θc,s 2], the global welfare is higher in the
alternative agreement than in the original agreement. Consider ﬁrst types θ ∈ [sc,s 2].
Together with sc <s (θ1) <s 2 in (A19), the last inequality in (A20) ensures that, in the
original agreement, some types θ ∈ [sc,s 2] selected their policies not from the sorting scheme











Consider next types θ ∈ (θc,s c). In the original agreement, the policy mixes for the aﬀected
types θ ∈ (θc,s 2] are in the region:
{(s,τ):W(s,τ;θc) ≤ W(s(θc),τ(θc);θc) and b p
w(s,τ) ≤ b p
w(sc,τc)}.
For any (s,τ) in this set, s ≥ sc.T h u s ,f o rθ ∈ (θc,s c), any policy mix selected under the
original agreement takes the form of over-subsidy, s(θ) >θ , and involves a weekly lower world
36price than does the sorting scheme in (A21). Hence, for any original policy mix (s(θ),τ(θ))
for θ ∈ (θc,s c),t h e r ee x i s t(b s,b τ) such that b s = s(θ) and b τ ≤ τ(θ) on the sorting scheme:
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s2,τ2) for s ≥ sc}. (A22)
We now follow three logical steps. First, if any policy mix takes the form of over-subsidy,






+[ θ − s]
∂Q
∂τ
< 0 for any s>θ . (A23)
Second, we compare two scenarios: (a) given the original mix (s(θ),τ(θ)), the home gov-
ernment with θ ∈ (θc,s c) is now “restricted” to select (b s = s(θ),b τ ≤ τ(θ)) from the set
(A22), and (b) the home government with θ ∈ (θc,s c) is allowed to select any policy mix
from the set (A22) with no such restriction. The home welfare is at least as high in (b) as
in (a), while the foreign welfare is the same in both cases. To summarize the two results,
for θ ∈ (θc,s c), the global welfare is at least as high in (A22) as in the original agreement.
Third, for θ ∈ (θc,s c), both (A21) and (A22) entail pooling at the same point (sc,τc) and
thus generate the same global welfare. Finally, for the overall aﬀected range (θc,s 2],w ec a n











Hence, the original agreement is not optimal, which causes a contradiction. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Given that s(0) = 0 and τ(0) > 0 by Lemma 5, we show
that any optimal agreement entails sorting at the bottom. Assume that an agreement is
optimal and involves pooling at (s(0),τ(0)) for θ ∈ [0,θ0] where θ0 > 0. Incentive com-
patibility implies that the policy mixes for θ>θ 0 are in the region {(s,τ):W(s,τ;θ0) ≤
W(s(0),τ(0);θ0)}.D e ﬁne (s0,τ0) as the policy mix that maximizes b pw(s,τ) subject to the
set:
{(s,τ):W(s,τ;θ0)=W(s(0),τ(0);θ0)}. (A24)
The world price within (A24) is maximized, when the iso-world-price function shifts down
either (i) until it is tangent to (A24) or (ii) until it crosses (A24) at zero tariﬀ. It then follows
that
0 <s 0 ≤ θ0.
37The second inequality is immediate: s0 = θ0 under (i) and s0 <θ 0 under (ii). Under (i), the
ﬁrst inequality is given by s0 = θ0 and θ0 > 0. Under (ii), given s(0) = 0,i fs0 =0 ,t h e n
τ(0) = 0, which is impossible by Lemma 5 and so s0 > 0.




w(s0,τ0) for all s ≤ s0}. (A25)
The policy set for s>s 0 r e m a i n st h es a m ea si nt h eo r i g i n a la g r e e m e n t . W en e x tc h e c k
incentive compatibility of the alternative agreement. The policy mix (s0,τ0) is in the set
(A24) and any policy mix for s>s 0 is in {(s,τ):W(s,τ;θ0) ≤ W(s(0),τ(0);θ0)}.T h u s ,
given s0 ≤ θ0 as shown above, types θ ≤ s0 do not mimic types θ>s 0 and their choices are
made from the sorting scheme (A25): s(θ)=θ for all θ ≤ s0.T h ei n c e n t i v eo ft y p e sθ>s 0
to mimic types θ ≤ s0 can be ignored: the associated home-welfare gain does not cause a
fall in the world price, since the original agreement satisﬁes the monotonicity: b pw(s0,τ0) ≥
b pw(s(θ),τ(θ)) for all θ. Therefore, inclusion of the sorting scheme (A25) increases the global
welfare for θ ≤ s0 and so the original agreement is not optimal, which causes a contradiction.
¥
Proof of Lemma 6. We show that, in any optimal agreement, for any θ,i fτ(θ) > 0,
then (s(θ),τ(θ)) is in the region:
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ) > b p
w(s = θ,τ =0 ) }. (A26)
Assume that an agreement is optimal and allows τ(θ) > 0 and b pw(s(θ),τ(θ)) ≤ b pw(s = θ,τ =
0) for some θ>0. Lemma 5 implies that there exists type
b θ =s u p {θ : b p
w(s(θ),τ(θ)) > b p
w(s = θ,τ =0 ) }
such that (i) the welfare function for b θ, {(s,τ):W(s,τ;b θ)=W(s(b θ),τ(b θ);b θ)}, crosses
{(s,τ):b pw(s,τ)=b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) } from below at a strictly positive tariﬀ, or (ii) it crosses
the zero-tariﬀ line, {(s,τ):τ =0 }. For those two cases, we below show that the agreement
is not optimal, which cause a contradiction.
Case (i): Let the crossing point be (b s,b τ):
W(b s,b τ;b θ)=W(s(b θ),τ(b θ);b θ) and b p
w(b s,b τ)=b p
w(s = θ,τ =0 ) .
38We may consider two possibilities: (a) (b s,b τ) 6=( s(b θ),τ(b θ)) and (b) (b s,b τ)=( s(b θ),τ(b θ)).T h e
case (a) occurs when the point (s(b θ),τ(b θ)) is located within the region (A26), which means
b pw(s(b θ),τ(b θ)) > b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) . The case (b) occurs when (s(b θ),τ(b θ)) is located on the
iso-world-price function {(s,τ):b pw(s,τ)=b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) }. In particular, this case occurs
when the policy set adjoining the point (s(b θ),τ(b θ)) from the left is continuous and is ﬂatter
than the iso-world-price function.
We ﬁrst consider the case (a). From the deﬁnition of (b s,b τ), it follows that b θ<b s. Observe
also that the original agreement places any policy mix for s ≥ b s in the region:
{(s,τ):W(s,τ;b θ) ≤ W(s(b θ),τ(b θ);b θ) and b p
w(s,τ) ≤ b p
w(s = θ,τ =0 ) }. (A27)




w(s = θ,τ =0 )for s ≥ b s}. (A28)
The policy set for s<b s is the same as in the original agreement. The alternative agreement
entails pooling for θ ∈ (b θ,b s) at (b s,b τ) and sorting for θ ∈ [b s,θ] along the set (A28). For the
aﬀected types θ ∈ (b θ,θ], the global welfare is at least as high in the alternative agreement
as in the original agreement. For θ ∈ [b s,θ], the alternative agreement involves sorting at a
weakly higher world price and thus generates at least as high global welfare as the original
agreement does. For θ ∈ (b θ,b s), the original agreement entails over-subsidy, s(θ) >θ ,a n d
involves a weekly lower world price than does the sorting scheme in (A28). Adopting the
argument used in the proof of Lemma 4, we can conﬁrm that, for θ ∈ (b θ,b s),t h ea l t e r n a t i v e
agreement generates at least as high global welfare as the original agreement does. In order to
show that the original agreement is not optimal, it now suﬃces to show that the alternative
a g r e e m e n ti si m p r o v e do nb yan e wp o l i c ys e t .
Suppose that the new policy set contains the sorting scheme for s>b s0 at the world price




c,τ =0 )for s ≥ b s
0}, (A29)
where θ
c < θ and b s0 < b s. The policy set for s<b s0 remains the same. As above, an endpoint
in (A29), (b s0,b τ
0),i sd e ﬁned as the crossing point that satisﬁes
W(b s
0,b τ





c,τ =0 ) .
39This policy set entails pooling for θ ∈ (b θ,b s0) at (b s0,b τ
0),s o r t i n gf o rθ ∈ [b s0,θ
c) along (A29) and
pooling for θ ∈ [θ
c,θ] at (θ
c,0). The pooling for θ ∈ (b θ,b s0) causes over-subsidy. Observing
that, if θ
c → θ,t h e n(b s0,b τ
0) → (b s,b τ) and so (A29) approaches (A28), we diﬀerentiate the
expected global welfare under (A29) with respect to θ




















As seen in (A13) in the proof of Proposition 1, if θ
c → θ, then the second term in (A30)
remains negative and the third term approaches zero. We next show that, if θ
c → θ,t h e
ﬁrst term is negative. To this end, supposing that θ
c falls slightly from θ,w es h o wt h a t ,f o r
θ ∈ (b θ,b s0), the global welfare is higher under pooling at (b s0,b τ
0) than under pooling at (b s,b τ).
We ﬁrst compare two scenarios: the home government with θ ∈ (b θ,b s0) is restricted to select
ap o i n t(b s,e τ) from (A29) that satisﬁes b pw(b s,e τ) > b pw(b s,b τ),a n dt h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n tw i t h
θ ∈ (b θ,b s0) is allowed to select any policy mix from (A29). For θ ∈ (b θ,b s0),t h eh o m ew e l f a r e
is at least as high in the second scenario as in the ﬁrst scenario, while the foreign welfare is
the same in both scenarios; the global welfare is at least as high in the second scenario as in
the ﬁrst scenario. Further, for θ ∈ (b θ,b s0), the global welfare is higher in the second scenario
than in the pooling at (b s,b τ), since tariﬀsa r el o w e ra t(b s,e τ) than at (b s,b τ) and
∂WG(s,τ;θ)
∂τ < 0
for any s>θ . We can thus claim that, for θ ∈ (b θ,b s0), the global welfare is higher under
pooling at (b s0,b τ
0) than under pooling at (b s,b τ). Hence, if θ
c → θ, then the expected global
welfare is higher in (A29) than in (A28).
We next consider the case (b) in which (b s,b τ)=( s(b θ),τ(b θ)). The original policy set
entails an over-subsidy interval: types θ ∈ (b θ,b s) select their policies from the region (A27)
for s ≥ b s = s(b θ). The remaining proof is analogous to the proof seen in the case (a), except
that the endpoint in (A29), (b s0,b τ
0),i sn o wd e ﬁn e da st h ep o i n ta tw h i c ht h ei s o - w o r l d - p r i c e
function (A29) crosses the original policy set that is continuous near (b s,b τ). ¥
Case (ii): When the iso-welfare function {(s,τ):W(s,τ;b θ)=W(s(b θ),τ(b θ);b θ)} crosses the
zero-tariﬀ line, we may consider two possibilities: (a) the function crosses the zero-tariﬀ line
only once and (b) it has two crossing points, (s1,0) and (s2,0) where s2 >s 1, such that
W(s1,0;b θ)=W(s2,0;b θ)=W(s(b θ),τ(b θ);b θ).
40The case (a) occurs when the iso-welfare function is tangent to the zero-tariﬀ line at (θ,0);
if the tangent point is not (θ,0), then the iso-welfare function crosses {(s,τ):b pw(s,τ)=
b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) } from below at a positive tariﬀ, which corresponds to the case (i) seen
a b o v e . T h ec a s e( b )o c c u r sw h e ns1 ≤ θ ≤ s2;i fs1 > θ or s2 < θ,t h e nt h ei s o - w e l f a r e
function crosses {(s,τ):b pw(s,τ)=b pw(s = θ,τ =0 ) } from below at a positive tariﬀ,w h i c h
corresponds to the case (i).
Consider ﬁrst the case (a). In the original policy set, if s<θ,t h e n(s,τ) is in the region
(A26) and if s ≥ θ,t h e n(s,τ) is in the region:
{(s,τ):W(s,τ;b θ) ≤ W(s = θ,τ =0 ;b θ) and b p
w(s,τ) ≤ b p
w(s = θ,τ =0 ) }. (A31)
A n yp o l i c ym i x(s,τ) that satisﬁes b pw(s,τ) ≤ b pw(s = θ,τ =0 )is in the region (A31). Any
(s,τ) in (A31) with a positive tariﬀ, τ>0,s a t i s ﬁes b pw(s,τ) < b pw(s = θ,τ =0 )and is
improved on by the zero-tariﬀ point (θ,0). Consider next the case (b). Any policy mix (s,τ)
that satisﬁes τ>0 and b pw(s,τ) ≤ b pw(s = θ,τ =0 )is in the region:
{(s,τ):W(s,τ;b θ) ≤ W(s = s2,τ =0 ;b θ) and b p
w(s,τ) ≤ b p
w(s = s2,τ =0 ) }. (A32)
Any policy mix (s,τ) in (A32) with a positive tariﬀ, τ>0,s a t i s ﬁes b pw(s,τ) < b pw(s = s2,τ =
0) and is improved on by the zero-tariﬀ point (s2,0). ¥
Proof of Proposition 5. We here show that no optimal policy set includes a sorting
scheme in which the world price is constant. First, we show that an optimal agreement
cannot have a sorting scheme at the bottom in which the world price is constant. Suppose
that an agreement is optimal and entails sorting at the bottom for θ ≤ θc along an iso-world-
price function {(s,τ):b pw(s,τ)=b pw(s(θc),τ(θc))}. We know from the text that an optimal
policy set, involving more than one world price, includes a jump at (s(θc),τ(θc)) such that
type θc is indiﬀerent between (s(θc),τ(θc)) and (s1,τ1);t y p e sθ ∈ (θc,s 1) pool at (s1,τ1).




c)) is made such that type
θ
0




c)) and (s(θc),τ(θc)). This alternative scheme thus
entails sorting for θ ∈ [0,θ
0





pooling at (s(θc),τ(θc)) for θ ∈ (θ
0





O(·;θ) represent the global welfare under the
alternative and original agreements, respectively. It follows that ∆(θ) > 0 for θ<θ
0
c,
∆(θ) < 0 for θ ∈ (θ
0
c,θ c) and ∆(θ)=0for θ ≥ θc.W e ﬁnd that diﬀerentiation of Eθ∆(θ)
41with respect to θ
0



















c falls slightly from θc, then import tariﬀsf o rθ ∈ [0,θ
0
c] falls along the new sorting scheme
where s(θ)=θ.T h u s ,i fθ
0
c → θc,t h e n
∂∆(θ)
∂θ0
c < 0 for θ ∈ [0,θ
0
c]. This strict inequality holds,
since the single-crossing property implies that, when θ
0







c)}, pivots on the point (s(θc),τ(θc)).
















∂τ > 0 at (s(θc),τ(θc)). On the other hand, if θ
0




c for θ ∈ (θ
0
c,θ c), associated with the new pooling at (s(θc),τ(θc))
approaches zero. To see this, suppose that an iso-welfare function, τ = τ(s), represents the
original sorting scheme where the foreign welfare is held constant. Along this scheme, the
original policy mix for θ ∈ (θ
0




=[ θ − s]
Q0D0
D0 − Q0 =0 .




c → θc, then the new pooling point approaches the original policy
mix along the original scheme; the ﬁrst-order diﬀerentiation of the home welfare at the new
pooling point approaches zero, which implies that the marginal home-welfare loss approaches
zero. Hence, if θ
0
c → θc,t h e n
∂∆(θ)
∂θ0
c → 0 for θ ∈ (θ
0
c,θ c).I ns u m m a r y ,i fθ
0
c falls slightly from
θc,t h e nEθ∆(θ) increases, which generates a contradiction.
Second, we extend this result beyond the interval at the bottom, [0,θ c].S u p p o s et h a ta n
agreement is optimal and includes a sorting scheme (as a policy subset) for θ ∈ (θ1,θ 2) in
which the world price is constant and s(θ)=θ. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the continuous policy subset for θ ∈ [0,θ c] in which the world price is strictly increasing is
followed by the sorting scheme for θ ∈ (θ1,θ 2):
{(s,τ):b p
w(s,τ)=b p
w(s(θ2),τ(θ2)) for s ∈ [s(θ1),s(θ2)]}. (A33)
The policy set then generates pooling for θ ∈ (θc,θ 1) such that θc is indiﬀerent between
(s(θc),τ(θc)) and (s(θ1),τ(θ1)). As in the proof of Lemma 6, we may consider two possi-
42bilities: (i) (s(θc),τ(θc)) 6=( s(θ1),τ(θ1)) and (ii) (s(θc),τ(θc)) = (s(θ1),τ(θ1)). The case (i)
occurs when the policy set involves a jump at (s(θc),τ(θc)),a n dt h ec a s e( i i )o c c u r sw h e n
the policy set adjoining the point (s(θc),τ(θc)) f r o mt h el e f ti sc o n t i n u o u sa n di sﬂatter than
the function (A33).





is made such that type θ
0




2)) and (s(θ2),τ(θ2)).T h i s























and pooling at (s(θ2),τ(θ2)) for θ ∈ [θ
0





















Note that the world price is higher in (A34) than in the original sorting scheme (A33), and
also that over-subsidy (s(θ) >θ ) occurs in the pooling interval for θ ∈ (θc,θ
0
1).D e ﬁning
∆(θ) as above, we ﬁnd that ∆(θ) > 0 for θ ∈ (θc,θ
0




2] and ∆(θ) < 0
for θ ∈ [θ
0
2,θ 2].T h er e s u l t ,∆(θ) > 0 for θ ∈ (θc,θ
0
1), is immediate from the proof of Lemma
6: for θ ∈ (θc,θ
0
1), the alternative agreement involves a lower domestic distortion in the form
of over-subsidy at a higher world price than does the original agreement. We next ﬁnd that
diﬀerentiation of Eθ∆(θ) with respect to θ
0




























2 → θ2, then the ﬁrst two terms are negative, but the third (positive) term approaches
z e r o ;a sw es h o wa b o v e ,i fθ
0
2 falls slightly from θ2, the marginal welfare loss for θ ∈ (θ
0
2,θ 2)




2)) approaches zero. Hence, the original agree-
ment is not optimal.
We next consider the case (ii) in which (s(θc),τ(θc)) = (s(θ1),τ(θ1)). The remaining proof





now deﬁned as the point at which the new sorting scheme (A34) crosses the original policy
set that adjoins (s(θc),τ(θc)) from the left. ¥
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